I. INTRODUCTION
Many economic issues need to be posed within a framework of intergenerational altruism, if they are to be analyzed in a proper way. Examples of such issues are numerous and'varied. Rawls [28] postulated intergenerational altruism in order to set his theory of justice in an intertemporal context.' Several models of the evolution of inequality over time rest critically on altruism (Becker and Tomes [4, 5 J, Bevan and Stiglitz [lo] , and Loury [21] ). The Ricardian equivalence theorem, as formulated by Barro [S] , leans heavily on an assumption of intergenerational altruism, and has well-known macroeconomic implications.
Studies in the conceptual foundations of the framework are also numerous. There is the familiar literature on consistent plans, initiated by Strotz [33] [32] , and others.
Intergenerational altruism has been modelled in two ways. First, there is what one might call the paternalistic model. Here, the utility of each generation depends on its own consumption and the consumptions of other generations. The term "paternalism" is used to emphasize the fact that generations care about what others actually consume, and not the utilities they derive from the act of consumption.2 Secondly, there is the nonpaternalistic model, in which each generation derives utility from its own consumption and the utilities of other generations. 3 There is now a substantial body of work on the paternalistic model. The entire literature on consistent plans falls into this category. Many applications of the altruism model, such as Arrow [2] and Dasgupta [ 131, belong here. Equilibria in this framework (which form the basis for an analysis of the properties of the model) have been recently studied in an extensive way (see Bernheim and Ray [6, 8, 91, Leininger [20] , Goldman [ 161, and Harris [ 171) . And finally, the positive and normative properties of these equilibria have been explored (Kohlberg [18] , Lane and Mitra [19] , and Bernheim and Ray [7] ).
In contrast, there have been very few rigorous studies of nonpaternalistic altruism, though this framework appears to be of somewhat greater interest in the context of applications (see, e.g., Barro [3] and Loury [21] ). This is understandable. After all, the position that generations care about others' utilities, and not in the manner these utilities are achieved, has a certain persuasiveness. 4 A few studies do explore one aspect of nonpaternalism, and this concerns its connections with the paternalistic model. A natural consistency property (sometimes also called "nonpaternalism"
(Archibald and Donaldson [ 1 ] )) allows the representation of some paternalistic utility indicators in a simple nonpaternalistic form, where the utility of each generation depends on its own consumption and the utility of its immediate successor (this is the form explored in Barro [3], for example). Streufert [32] contains a comprehensive study of this consistency property. The representation of nonpaternalistic functions in paternalistic form has also been the object of z Some paternalistic functions may indeed express intergenerational harmony of interests. But then they will have nonpaternalistic representations (more on this below). ' There is also, of course, a mixed framework with both paternalistic and nonpaternalistic components.
But I know of no work addressing such a model. 'The persuasiveness is not complete though, as a little reflection on the "generation gap" will reveal! limited attention; a fairly general treatment of a finite horizon model appears in Pearce [25] . But a systematic analysis of the relationship between these two frameworks is yet to be written, and appears to be quite a challenge, especially for models with an infinite horizon.
This paper conducts a direct study of the behavioural foundations of the nonpaternalistic model. The first line of business is the definition of an equilibrium outcome, and a demonstration of its existence in a general setting. This is one of the main tasks of the present paper. The notion of an equilibrium outcome is adapted in an obvious way from the concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in extensive-form games (the nonpaternalistic structure is not itself a game, though conflicts of interest may well be present ).5
In this paper, I state and prove an existence theorem for a class of models that exhibits an extremely general form of nonpaternalistic altruism. In particular, each generation's utility may depend on those of any number of future generations.
The existence result asserts the following, in the context of a stationary modeL6 There exist an indirect utilit~~ ,function and a savings policy. both depending on current endowment, such that each generation finds it optimal to adopt that savings policy provided its descendants use the same policy and exhibit the given indirect utility. In addition, the indirect utility function generated by the generation's maximization problem is also the same as that "announced" by its descendants. Such equilibria correspond to Markov subgame-perfect equilibria in paternalistic models (Bernheim and Ray [6, 91)' It is of interest to note that the paternalistic models do not turn out to be equally well-behaved with respect to existence. While the existence of Markov equilibrium is guaranteed in simple paternalistic structures, where each generation's concern extends to only the consumption of its immediate successor (Bernheim and Ray [6] It is therefore surprising that nonpaternalistic models yield the existence of an equilibrium even in the context of perfect certainty. In fact, the introduction of uncertainty (an extension not pursued here) only makes the existence proof simpler, and can be easily accommodated with the techniques developed here.
Some existence results do appear in the literature, dealing with nonpaternalistic structures where altruism is confined to one's immediate successor. Streufert [32] proves a very general result for a multisectoral model in this context, and Loury [21] has an earlier proof for the aggregative model. These are certainly of interest.
The problem, though, with the simple nonpaternalistic structure is that it leaves no room for conflicts of interest. Indeed, as I mentioned before, there must be perfect harmony of interests between each generation and its descendant for this specification of altruism to be operative. Predictably, the equilibrium solution to this model is often an optimal one, viewed from the vantage point of each generation. This is easily seen in the case where the utility function of each generation is additively separable in its own consumption and the utility of the next generation (discounted). Here, one can use the notion of one-step unimprovability, familiar in dynamic programming, to yield the optimality of every equilibrium path.Y There also appears to be a general connection between unimprovability and the non-additive simple nonpaternalistic structure (Streufert [ 321) . However, conflicts of interest play a central role in more general forms of altruism. This is expected to manifest itself in the lack of some optimality properties of the equilibrium solution.
A natural candidate is the examination of Pareto-optimality.
But there are problems with this concept. unless the nonpaternalistic structure can be shown to have a paternalistic representation and the examination is carried out in the transformed model. Such an exercise is not attempted in the present paper.
However, it can be shown that equilibrium programs may even fail to achieve a far weaker efficiency property. Below, I describe a class of cases (Sect. TIC) where equilibrium programs are inefficient in the sense that more consumption can be feasibly provided at every date (Malinvaud [22] ). The equilibrium path can therefore display efficiency failures of a drastic sort. In the light of the discussion above, such failures are only possible if altruism extends to the utilities of descendants other than one's immediate successor.
The paper also contains results on the behaviour of equilibrium paths (Sect. IIb) in the case where the current generation's utility is additively ') This is because in the particular context at hand, an unimprovable strategy is easily interpretable as an equilibrium for the nonpaternalistic structure.
separable in its own consumption and some function of the utilities of its descendants. Here, equilibrium paths are shown to converge monotonically to a steady state from any initial stock (Theorem C). Moreover, equilibrium programs can be conveniently "ordered" in the sense that equilibrium stocks from a higher initial endowment must be higher at each date. Throughout, I restrict myself to an aggregative framework of intertemporal accumulation, with stationary technology and no uncertainty. An initial endowment is given, which is divided by the current generation into consumption and investment. Investment yields output via a production function, and this forms the endowment of the next generation. The process then repeats itself. This model has been widely used in the literature on efficient and optimal growth," and in the particular context of intergenerational altruism." Analysis of the multidimensional case is an open question. I2 It should be reiterated, though, that uncertainty only makes the analysis simpler, so that the assumption of perfect certainty is not restrictive. And finally, identical techniques can be used to establish the existence of nonstationary equilibria in a nonstationary model. In Section 2, I spell out the model and its assumptions. The main results are stated and discussed here. Proofs are relegated to Section 3.
THE MODEL
The technology is given by a production function f: R +. + R + I shall assume
,f is increasing and continuous, and Remarks.
( 1) Technology (and preferences, below) are taken to be time-stationary.
But as I have mentioned above, this assumption can be dropped.
(2) Assumption (F.2) can be dispensed with at the expense of some work, using truncation arguments described in Bernheim and Ray [6] .
Let v, denote the utility of generation s, and let u' = (0, + , , u,,~,...). The prqferences of each generation are described by a nonpaternatistic, ancestor-insensitive utility function U: I&!: + [WY, which maps, for each t, (c,, ~1') into utilities of generation t. I shall assume that for each f, (u.1) II is increasing and strictly concave in c,, and non-decreasing in I',. s > 1.
(~2) II is continuous in the product topology on nonnegative realvalued sequences. Remarks.
(1) It is assumed that the concern of each generation extends to only its descendants. Concern for one's ancestors can be easily incorporated if this is separable with respect to U. If not, the concept of equilibrium that I present below must be expanded to include historydependence. However, the method used here is readily applicable to that case.
(2) The assumption of weak complementarity (u.3) is essential for the way I establish the existence result. Whether the theorem is true without this assumption is an interesting open question."
(3) The boundedness assumption (u.4) is really a generalization of some notion of time-preference or discounting. Consider for a moment an additively separable utility function of the simple form u(c,, u') = M'(C,) + &I,+,, 6 > 0.
" The assumption that 11 maps into R + is really not a restriction, but only makes the notation easier. What is important is assumption (u.2), which rules out unboundedly negative utilities at the origin.
I4 If 11 1s differentiable. this amounts to the nonnegativity of the cross-partial derivatives -1 ,T r--u,c'c, cc,. s > f.
" Below (proof of Theorem A) it will be seen that the assumption allows me to restrict attention to spaces of nondecreasing functions, on which I can place a tractable topology that works in the present context. (2) Observe that for special forms of altruism, such as the one-step recursion tic,, u,+ ,), the last equalities in (3) involving the function s* are redundant in the constraints of problem (2) .
(3) Equilibria may be analogously defined for general history dependent policies and indirect utilities. It can be checked that the present version continues to be a solution in this more general class of functions.
It follows from the defmition of an equilibrium that if generations t + 1, t + 2,... all 'Lannounce" a policy s* and indirect utility u*, then it is optimal for generation t to do so. It is in this sense that an equilibrium can be said to depict a form of consistent behaviour. Note again the close analogy between this solution concept and that of (Markov) subgame perfect equilibrium developed for extensive form games. 1 t(u.4) an equilibrium (v*, s*) esists. The equilibrium indirect utility o* must be an increasing function. There is an equilibrium policy s* that is nondecreasing.
Theorem A establishes that the equilibrium concept developed here is not vacuous in a wide class of situations.
The equilibrium indirect utility is increasing in endowment, and this is natural, given (u.1). The fact that there is always a non-decreasing equilibrium pohcy is of greater interest. The result hinges on (u.1) and (u. We can now establish THEOREM B. Under (u. 1) and (US), if (u, s) is an equilibrium, then s must he nondecreasing.
Theorem B parallels, as 1 said, results for paternalistic models. Similar results have also been useful in the analysis of aggregative optimal growth models with nonconvexities in production (see, e.g., Dechert and Nishimura [ 141 and Mitra and Ray [24]). Specifically, it yields in a straightforward way the time-monotonicity of equilibrium paths, and in particular, their convergence to some steady state.
To state this, we need some notation and definitions. Call x a fixed point qfs (under,f) ifs = s'>f(~). , and (u.5), every equilibrium path of (v, s) is monotone in stocks, which converge to a fixed point of Q(s) underf Every fixed point of s has the stocks of at least one equilibrium path converging to it. Finally, if (x, y, c ) (resp. (x', y', c' ) ) are equilibrium paths from y (resp. y'). then y > y' implies x, > xi, y, 2 y; for all t.
Theorem C shows that equilibrium programs have a great deal of structure and in particular, display steady state properties in a fairly general class of situations. Specifically, the result holds for very broad versions of nonpaternalistic altruism, extending to an arbitrary number of descendants.
2c. Normative Properties
The most obvious normative question that one can ask of these equilibria is: Are they Pareto-optimal?
But we are on slippery ground here, for the lack of Pareto-optimality implies the existence of a feasible program with utilities higher for all concerned. However nothing in the model so far allows us to define utility levels for each generation, given any feasible program. Utilities are defined on equilibrium programs,16 but this is not a rich enough set to test for Pareto-optimality with respect to all feasible programs, equilibrium or not. One is therefore inexorably led to the following question:
What kinds of nonpaternalistic functions have utility representations on the set of all consumption programs, or in short, paternalistic representations?
(The reverse link is also important for different reasons. ) " This question (and its converse) is the subject of future work. Here, I shall use a weaker normative notion, that of consumption-efficiency (see, e.g., Malinvaud [22] ). This is a relatively mild efficiency concept that requires that there be no other feasible program with consumptions higher at every date. In this model, Pareto-optimality (given that the representation problem is solved) would imply consumption efficiency, but not vice versa. It follows, therefore, that a failure of consumption efficiency is indeed a failure of a rather drastic kind.
Here, I provide an example (actually sufficient conditions in a specific model) where equilibrium programs are inefficient. Note at the outset that altruism extends to more than one descendant in the example. Consider this for a moment in the context of a paternalistic model. There, limited altruism is actually a form of myopia, relative to, say, a planner who would consider the entire stream of consumptions. However, in a large class of models, this myopia, while it does cause Paretoinoptimality, does not do away with consumption-efficiency (the equilibrium program underaccumulates stocks, if anything (see Bernheim and Ray [7] )). In the nonpaternalistic case, only the simple one-step altruistic formulation (u(c,, 21') = li( c,, u, + 1 )) can guarantee optimality properties (see, e.g., Streufert [32] ). But caring for any further descendants through their utilities results in a tendency to overaccumulate stocks." This is the source of the inefficiency. Ix One point regarding the example: my assumptions as stated do not cover this case, By (u. I ). u must be increasing in c. but this is not satisfied in the example when U, + , = U, + 2 = 0. So a fixed-point argument (the one used in the proof of Theorem A) cannot rule out trivial equilibria of the form a*( ?;) = 0 in these cases. These equilibria are inefficient but I do not push them as serious cases of efficiency failure. The claim below holds for nontrivial equilibria which are explicitly computed. " Specifically, in this example, when the conditions for inefficiency are met, the resulting equilibrium program results in limit stocks that exceed the "golden rule." "These concern the convergence arguments made in the crucial continuity lemma (Lemma 6). The present construction sidesteps these difficulties. 
Proof:
Observe that the maximization of (7) Q.E.D.
By Lemma 1, we are done if we exhibit a 17 E Z" that solves itself. This will occupy the rest of the proof.
Our next lemma establishes that if the policy and indirect utility employed by succeeding generations are USC and nondecreasing, then the best response of the current generation can be chosen to have the same properties. LEMMA 2. Let z E Z. Then there is a unique z* E Z such that z* solves z.
Proojl Given : = (~1, s)EZ, pk(.) as defined by (5) clearly nondecreasing (in fact, strictly increasing) . Finally, to show that D* is USC, fix y E [0, f) and take a sequence I"' + y. Let Y be a sequence of maximizers for (7), for each .V, and without loss of generality (w.1.o.g.) let I" -+ X. Then L'*(?',,)=u(.Y,l--y,, f?.G)).
Taking limits and using the fact that 3 is USC, lim o*( y,) < u( y -s, P(X)) ,I -% The claim that c'* E K is established.
Define for each y E [lo, f), @(.v)=(a;y~rjxu(y-x, P(x))). . 1.'
We now prove that if y, > y, , x,E@(~,), and x,E@(Y~), then x,>,K~. Suppose this is not the case for some y, > y2, X, E @( ~1~) and x2 E @( yz). Observe that by definition of @, u(.r, --XI, P(-q)m&j -.x2, @x2)) and U(l',-S,, ~(x~))3u(.Y-x,, P(x,)).
Adding both sides of (10) and (11) and transposing,
Combining ( 12) and (13),
>u(y, --.x2, t(x*))-u(y~-x2, qxJ).
But (14) contradicts the strict concavity of u in r, because y-x, >Jz-.Kz. Next, let ~1, be a sequence in [0, Y) with JJ~ -+ ~1, t',, 2 I'; all n. Let x,~ E @( ~1,). Then if x is a limit point of s,,, I claim that ,i E @( 4~). To show this, assume w.1.o.g. that x,, +.x and proceed by contradiction.
Then there is X* E [0, +r] with u( y -x*, P(x*)) > u( y -.K, P(x)).
By our earlier results, because y,, 1 y, it must be that x,, 1 x. So, given that fk(.) is USC, nondecreasing, and therefore rightcontinuous,
Note that because y,, 1 JI, I* E [O, J*,~]. But this, together with (15) and (16) is a contradiction to the fact that s,, E @( >I,,), all n, for with large n, 4 I',, -x*, I+* )) > u( y,, -x,,, P(x,,)).
This argument establishes in particular that @(J;) is compact for each J'. Define s*(y) = max @(J'), ~2 E [0, Y), and s*(Y) = Y. By our result on @, s* must be nondecreasing. It remains to show that s* is USC. To do so, let ~3,~ + .r, suppose, w.l.o.g., that lim,, s*( y,,) exists, and assume, contrary to the claim, that lim s*( j*,,) > s*(y).
(18) II Then it must be the case that for all large n, .r,, > .r (otherwise nondecreasingness of s*(.) is violated). But in this case, by the argument above, lim,, s*( y,,) E Q(y), and so (18) violates the construction of s*(.). It remains to show that s*(.) is the only USC selection from @(.). Suppose there is some other J? E S such that s^( y) E Q(y), ,r E [0, 8). Then for some FE [0, Y), s*( i,) >9( J;). Let ~"4 I;; since by assumption, .I: is USC, s^( j) 2 lim sup, s^(y"). Thus, there exists N such that s*( +$) > s^( y") while yN > I^,. But this contradicts the monotonicity property of @ established earlier.
We have therefore established that s* E S, and earlier that v* E K. And by construction, it is clear that z* = (o*, s*) E Z solves z = (0, s).
Q.E.D.
Thus, for all z E 2, we can find a unique z* E 2 that solves z. So we have a mapping H: Z -+ Z, which yields, for every z E Z, a "best response" H(z) for the current generation.
Endow the space S and K with the topology of weak convergence (see Billingsley [ 11, p. 221) and Z with the product topology.
LEMMA 3. Eoery continuous rnapping,frorn Z into itself has a fixed point.
Proof: S and K are compact by Helly's selection theorem (see Billingsley [ 11, p. 2271) therefore so is Z. Endowed with the weak topology, these are also convex subsets of a locally convex vector space, so Z also has this property. Thus by the Schauder--Tychonoff theorem (Smart [ 30, p. 15] ), Z has the fixed point property.
Before proceeding to the main continuity result (Lemma 6) we establish 
ProoJ By the assumptions of the lemma, each a,, b, has at most countably many discontinuities. So the a,'s together have at most countably many discontinuities on [0, 81 and so have the b,'s. We can therefore pick a sequence from the continuity points of the ak's, xy, with xy I x*. Likewise, pick a sequence .ry J .r*, on the continuity points of the h,'s, taking care that .ry 3 xy, all q.
Perform a recursive construction as follows. Define ~(0, q) = n(k, 0) = 1 for all (k. q) ~0. For (li, q) 3 1, suppose that n(s, t) is defined for all s = 0 ,..., k -1 and t =0 ,..., q-1. Then define n(k, q) with n(k, q) > n(X--1, q) and n(k, q) > n(k, q -1) so that for all n 2 n(k, q), I la;'(-u,)-u,(.u,)l G-3 q and 1
Define nq = n(q, q). Then II, = n(q, q) > n(q, q -1) > n(q -1, q -1) = n,-, , so that ?zy is a well-defined subsequence of n. Now fix k. Then for large q, n,, = n(q, q) > n(li, q). So, by the construction of n(k, q), It is easy to check that Us is right-continuous, given the assumptions of the lemma. Using this and (22), the RHS of the inequality above tends to 0 as q + a. A similar argument holds for the h,'s, so we are done.
It remains to establish the continuity of H with respect to the topology on Z. This is done in LEMMA 6. H: Z -+ Z is continuous.
Ptmj:
Let z" -+ ,-in Z. W.l.o.g., let 2" G H(z") + t in Z. We are to show that P = H(z). Using (5) and (6), define p; and p by the sequence z", and pk, v by z. Let f = (t;, s^); first, we show that s^( 4') solves (7) for all J* e [0, F), given z.
Let s* be the unique policy in S that solves (7), given z. It clearly suffices to show that s*( ~1) =s^( y) at all points of continuity of the former, given that s* and .? are both USC and nondecreasing.
Suppose there is some y* E [0, P) such that s*( JI*) # s^( y*). Then, letting x* = s*( y*), the strict inequality in (19) following from the fact that if s* is continuous at y*, @(J'*) must be a singleton, otherwise the monotonicity property of @ established in the proof of Lemma 2 will be violated. Now regard @ as the sequence a; in Lemma 5 with limit P, = ak. Similarly, identify (,?', fi0.Y) with the sequence 6;, and their limits with the b,'s. Given x*, ,r*, and Lemma 4, all the conditions of Lemma 5 are satisfied. So there is a sequence (X y, j,,) 1 (.x*, y*) and a subsequence ny such that li>(xy) 4 P,(.u*), k3 1, (24) ^,Z vkqPq I',)) + P,(S( )a*)), h-3 1.
and P( J'<,) + s^( .1'* ).
Combining (23))(26) and using the continuity of u, we have, for large q, u( yy -xy, Pyx,)) > u( ?',, -s"y y,), Pq.?y yy))), l-27) but (27) contradicts the fact that .9 solves (7) for each J' E [0, 8), given z"q = (u"", .+). This establishes that s'= s*. Finally, we must prove that ri is the indirect utility arising from the maximization of (7), given (u, s).
As a first step, I claim that if x,, 4 .Y in [0, ?), then for each k, lim sup P;(.:(-u,,) 6 Vk(.y). ,I
Suppose that this is not true for some k, .Y, and x,, -+ s. W.l.o.g., let @(.Y,,) converge; then there is N and 6 > 0 such that P;(x,J -P&v) > 6, II 3 N.
Using the right continuity of c,, pick X' > .Y such that .Y' is a point of continuity of 1',, and P,( x') -P,(x) < 6/2.
Now pick m >, N such that X, < .Y' and
Combining ( 
where the x,,'s solve (7) for 5, given )'. Let ,v* be a continuity point of t;. W.1.o.g. let u"( +v*) converge. Suppose C( ~a*) = lim C"( JJ*) < u*( y*). 
which contradicts the definition of ti". Q.E.D.
Proqf'qf Theoretn A. By Lemmas 3 and 6, there is (z)*, s*) E Z such that (zl*, s*) = H(v*, s*); i.e., such that (u*, s*) solves itself. Denote by (6, s") the restriction of (u* .I',+, =f~4)',), t 20.
We claim that either rr 6 J',+, , all t, or J,> yl+ r, all t. Suppose y, < yl. Then by Theorem B, s( yO) < s( y, ). So using (41) and (F.l ), y, < y2. Extend this argument for all t. A similar line of reasoning applies if -yO > y,.
So (J*,) is a monotone bounded sequence. Consequently (x,) is a monotone bounded sequence, converging to s*, say. We have x 1+1 =.s,~j'(s,), t 3 0.
(42 1
Passing to the limit in (42) easily yields that s* is a fixed point of @p(s) under j:
Now let i-be a fixed point of s under ,f: Take y E .~~'(.<). The resulting equilibrium program trivially converges to .i-.
Finally, let (s, ~1, c) (resp. (x'. ~a', c' ) be an equilibrium path from y (resp. y'), and let y b y'. Then the fact that s is nondecreasing can be easily shown to imply s, 3 s:, J', 3 ~1: for all t.
Q.E.D. So the optimal savings policy for the current with 2 given by (45). (45) generation is s*(y) = 2):
Now we calculate z)*(y), the indirect utility that results from (43). This is easily computed to be TO compute the equilibrium, we set (o*, s*) = (u, s); i.e., 
It is now easily seen, either by direct computation, or by applying the Cass criterion for efficiency of a feasible program (Cass [ 12] ), that the equilibrium program is inefficient if and only if /J + cry > 1.
3. R. BARRO, Are government
